It has become clear in my observations of others’ behaviors over the course of, and the eventual dissolution of a relationship that one may be able to draw a graph showing relative value of items exchanged between the parties involved in couplehood, similar, perhaps, to the way currencies are described between differing nations.

First, let us posit that two individuals are functioning as independent central banks, with their places of residence as separate economic zones or nations. In the early stages of a relationship, few items will have been exchanged; thus, in relation to each other, the currencies are in a state of parity, not unlike the USD and the CDN; one may consider that items can be exchanged on a one-for-one ratio.

As time progresses, however, the number of items transferred between the two nations grows. Eventually, the two peoples’ economies become rather entangled with one another. Ideally, the number of items exchanged between the two will have maintained some sort of parity–certain albums are at the other persons’ place, but with relatively equal value, should any shocks occur, no major amount of value is lost.

At this stage in the entanglement, often times the notion of a form of merger is floated: a common economic zone with a shared currency, not unlike the Euro or the proposed Asian Currency Unit. Regardless of whether the two entities combine under a single crown or instead form a commonwealth, this can pose a problem for the items used in trading–duplicates and redundancies will naturally arise. In such a case, these duplicates become devalued and withdrawn from the system as a whole, and ownership ceases to be individual, but rather communal.

Problems, however, will naturally arise when, inevitably, political winds change and the parties wish to dissolve the partnership. When this occurs before a common currency has arisen, the fast and furious desire to see all items of value return to the original economic zone can cause capital flight; the side slower to react often finds itself having their items drastically devalued compared to the other party’s, a dangerous situation should the other party choose to cease recognizing any value in any remaining items in the foreign zone. At this point, there is precious little incentive for the party acting more quickly to negotiate an egalitarian settlement with the laggard.

If this has occured after a common central bank was formed, the situation can be even thornier–the civil disorder that arises from any attempt at splitting a unitary organization causes numerous headaches, with territorial disputes and competing interests for valuation.

It is therefore suggested by this->one that under no circumstances should a unified central bank between two separate entities ever be considered, unless there is a greater threat (for instance, a fearsome opponent on the Eastern Front that threatens to conquer and assimilate all with mammoth tanks and tesla troops); if a unified central bank does form, a protective policy would be best, with very tight currency controls limiting the amount in a foreign zone and/or a rapid response plan to withdraw all outstanding items within a short period of time.